The concept of privacy-preserving data mining has been recently been proposed in response to the above concerns derived from data mining algorithms.We can build many data mining models without disclosing the input data [1, 2] .Specifically, the implementation of privacy-preserving data mining model is mainly considering the following two aspects: (1) How to preventprivacy leak in the data mining process; (2) How to make the data or result more utility.Currently, the field of privacy preserving data mining research work has focused on how to design privacy principles and algorithms to achieve a better balance between these two aspects.
In the last few years,ε-differential privacy [3] [4] [5] [6] has emerged asa new criterion that provides a more robust privacy guarantee, regardless of the adversary's background knowledge.The basic idea ofε-differential privacy is to add enough noise to theanalysis results performed on a sensitive dataset before the result published. Specifically, given any two databases that differ on exactly onerecordr, a data mining algorithm that satisfiesε-differentialprivacy will output randomized results with almost identical probability distributions.
The randomized results ensure that it ishard for the adversary to identify any individualrecord in the dataset, even if the adversary knows the informationof all remaining records.
However, there are two problems inε-differential privacy. The firstis that ε just limits how much one individual can affect the resulting model, not how much information is revealed about an individual [7] .This issue will lead individuals to be easily identified by the adversary after he observes the randomized result. The second is thatthere is no intuitively policy to set the privacy parameter ε . Paper [7] proposed a definitionρ-differential identifiability that provides the same guarantees as differential privacy, but the parameter ρ bounds the probability estimate that an individual contributed to the resulting model.Therefore, the policy makers can set the ε based the ρ -differential identifiability. But ρ-differential identifiabilityassumes that the prior probability of an individual being in the input dataset is must the same for all individual.It means that ρ -differential identifiability depend on prior distribution. However, it is usual that the prior probability for all individual is not equivalent, or even ishard to know.
In this paper, we propose a tactic which is independent on prior probability, named LPB (Limiting Privacy Breaches), to set the ε privacy parameter intuitively. LPBformalize the privacy of an individual through ρ 1 , ρ 2 -privacy proposed in paper [8] . Informally, ρ 1 , ρ 2 -privacy, where0 < ρ 1 < ρ 2 < 1, means that if the adversary's prior belief (beforeseeing the randomized result) that an individual is in the input dataset is no more than ρ 1 , his posterior belief(after seeing the randomized result) that an individual istruly in the input datasetis no more than ρ 2 . In other words, publishing the randomized result changes the belief of the adversary by at most ρ 2 − ρ 1 . We will give a good intuitively policy to set the ε for satisfying a given ρ 1 , ρ 2 -privacy requirement. In a word, LPB ensures that, if the prior belief about individual is bounded by some thresholdρ 1 , the posterior belief, given the published randomized result, is no more than another threshold ρ 2 .
The remainingsections of this paper are organized as follows. Related works are presented in Section 2. We introduce some basic notation in Section 3. In Section 4, we show how to limiting privacy breaches in differential privacy. Experiments and conclusion appear in Section 5
and Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Many privacy models consider individual identity disclosure.The key idea of these modelsis to protect an individual to be uniquelyre-identified.Samarati and Sweeney [9] proposed k-anonymity model.K-anonymity ensures thateach record in the table cannot be distinguishedfrom other k-1 records in the same group.
We call these records which are not distinguished an equivalence class. Thoughk-anonymity prevents record linkage, no constraints are put on sensitive attribute.
Therefore, the adversary can use homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack to infer the sensitive attribute value of the victim.Paper [10] proposes the diversity principle, calledl-diversity, to prevent attribute linkage.Thel-diversity requires an equivalence classto contain at leastldistinct sensitive values.
K-anonymity and l-diversityare good privacy models to prevent the adversary from uniquely identifying an individual's record. However, these models are targeted to theparticular attack model,and they assume the adversary's knowledge is limited. Due to both their vulnerability to adversaries'backgroundinformation and their deterministic nature, many types of privacy attack have been proposed on these approaches derived using these models, leading to privacy compromise.
In contrast, ε-differential privacy, a new privacy model from the field of statistical disclosure control,is first proposed by D.Work [3] Differential privacy provides strong privacy guarantees that do not depend on an adversary's background knowledge. However, therehaveno good policies to set the privacy parameterε.
Paper [7] proposed adefinition of ρ -differential identifiabilityas an alternate formulation, parameterized by the probability of individual identification. It is the first workthat provides a parameterization based on the risk of identifying an individual for differential privacy, while letting policy makers set parameters based on the concept of differential identifiability.
Our work isan extension version ofρ-differential identifiability.We propose a tactic which is independent on prior probability, and formalize the privacy of an individual through ρ 1 , ρ 2 -privacy.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we assume that a database D contains n tuples, i.e., 
B. Privacy Model
In this paper, we assume the adversary is an informed adversary. 
.Now, we compute    -privacy, paper [8] proposed an approach ofamplification.
Definition 5[8]. A randomization operator
M is at most  -amplifying for all result
Pr
may return this result. Therefore, we get the following equation according to Laplace mechanism.
Therefore, we have an import conclusion, for any informed adversary if This implies that it is impossible to protect the privacy of individuals in the database with the probability less than the prior probability . An adversary's probability of a correct random guess is 1/|U| which is presented in the Table II as RG.   .LPB shows that the magnitude of the noisy added not only depend on the posterior probability, but also depend on the prior probability.   is, the more noisy is needed. Therefore, for some prior probability more than the probability of random guess  increases, the noisy needed also increases because  getting bigger (showed in Figure   1 ). 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a tactic to set the privacy parameter for  -differential privacyintuitively.
Compared to differential identifiability which assumes that the prior probability of an individual being in the input dataset is the same for all individual, our work provides a more flexible privacy parameter setting methods which do not depend on the prior probability.In the future work, we intend to investigate other version differential privacy such as probability differential privacy [11] support  
,
 -privacy as well. 
